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Abstract
This paper characterizes optimal security design in the context of a cor-
porate ¯nancing problem with monitoring and demand for liquidity. Optimal
incentives to monitor the ¯rm suggest that large block shareholder invest-
ments be illiquid. But the liquidity premium on illiquid investments may be
so high that it may be e±cient to trade o® optimal incentives for greater
liquidity. Building on the fundamental complementarity between speculative
monitoring (which increases the informativeness of prices) and active moni-
toring (which is enhanced when investments are more liquid), the paper then
spells out the conditions on the underlying parameters under which more or
less liquidity is warranted. Finally, the model is applied to the analysis of
common exit provisions in venture capital ¯nancing.
1 We are grateful to John Coates, Denis Gromb, Josh Lerner, Stuart Myers and Ailsa Roell for
helpful suggestions. We thank participants at the NBER Corporate Finance Meetings of 14 April 2000
for comments. Contact Information: Please send all correspondence to: Patrick Bolton, Department of
Economics, Princeton University, Princeton NJ 08544; phone: (609) 258 40 37; fax: (609) 258 64 19;
email: pbolton@princeton.edu
11 Introduction
A large fraction of the most successful US ¯rms in the last decade have grown out of
venture capital ¯nancing. This is most evident in the high technology, computer software,
and biotechnology sectors. Venture capital (VC) is generally described as short to medium
term investments by specialized funds in \high-growth, high-risk, ¯rms that need equity
capital to ¯nance product development"2. VC funds provide ¯rms not only capital and
reputation but also managerial advice and intensive monitoring ( see Lerner (1995)).
However, VCs' managerial involvement decreases over time as ¯rms gain experience and
reputation. At some point, for the successful ventures, it is more pro¯table to move away
from venture capital ¯nancing by going public, switching to straight bank ¯nancing, or
merging with another ¯rm. In other words, VC ¯nancing is a temporary form of ¯nancing
in a ¯rm's life-cycle and an important aspect of the contracting relationship between VC
funds and ¯rms is the design of the exit mechanism for the fund3. This paper provides a
¯rst attempt at a formal analysis of this exit problem using the methodology of mechanism
design theory.
An increasingly in°uential view is that controlling shareholders' ability to unwind their
positions at any time must be restricted to ensure e±cient monitoring. Otherwise, the
argument goes, (controlling) shareholders will be tempted to \exit" before \voicing" their
disapproval of management's actions. According to this view there is a trade-o® between
the liquidity of a controlling shareholder's stake and e®ective shareholder control.4Yet,
looking at recent data on the number of IPOs of VC ¯nanced ¯rms and the aggregate
amount of new capital invested into VC funds, Black and Gilson (1998) ¯nd a positive
2See Black and Gilson (1998).
3The average holding period for VC investors' shares in a portfolio's ¯rm, is under 5 years (Sahlman
1990).
4In particular, see Co®ee (1991); other authors such as Mayer (1988), Bhide (1993), Roe (1994) and
Kojima (1995), further suggest that a strength of Japanese and German corporate governance systems
is that they ensure better involvement in ¯rms of large (institutional) shareholders by restricting their
ability to trade controlling blocks in secondary markets. They argue that shareholder activism in the US
and the UK can only work e®ectively when similar trading restrictions on active institutional investors
are set up. Accordingly, they advocate the reversal of US stock market regulations which, they argue,
have systematically pursued secondary market liquidity over e®ective shareholder control.
2correlation over time between VC investment turnover and the °ow of capital to VC.
Figure 1 here.
At the same time, existing time series show that the average holding period in US
venture capital ¯rms (prior to exit by the VC fund), has decreased from about eight to
less than ¯ve years over the past two decades. Many authors, including Black and Gilson,
would suggest that the increase in the number of (ex-post) investment opportunities is
the primary cause for the corresponding boom in venture-capital backed IPOs. However,
Figure 1 tells us that the amount of capital invested in VC funds has also increased
substantially over the recent period, and therefore one may wonder why the increase in
the number of ex post investment opportunities, was not simply absorbed by the new
venture capital funding, in a way that would have left the average holding period of each
individual VC investment essentially unchanged. In other words, can we explain why the
increased °ow of capital to VC did not seem to have a noticeable o®setting e®ect on the
average frequency of venture-capital backed IPOs? Is there instead some kind of a causal
relationship between the VC fund supply and the IPO boom?
To discuss this and other aspects of exit in venture capital ¯nancing, we consider a
contracting model with shareholder monitoring and securities trading. The model formal-
izes the relationship between an institutional investor (VC fund), its capital providers,
¯rms, and potential buyers or underwriters, in an environment in which the VC fund is
subject to liquidity shocks, and therefore values exit options. Our framework is set up
to re°ect the main stages of the ¯nancial life cycle of a ¯rm. At the initial stage, the
capital provider (or alternatively the ¯rm) must determine whether to restrict liquidity
(or \exit") in order to maintain incentives for active monitoring (or \voice") by the VC
fund prior to exit. At a later stage, when more capital is needed or when the initial
VC investors want to sell out (that is, when a liquidity shock occurs), the VC fund exits
whenever this is allowed by the initial contract, and under the terms speci¯ed by that
contract, which in turn may depend on the speculative information generated by potential
buyers or underwriters.
3We ¯rst ¯nd that the optimal choice of liquidity depends on the underlying demand
for liquidity of the active monitor and other investors, the accuracy of the ¯rm's valuation
at the time of exit, and the cost of speculative monitoring. Under some parameter values
it may be optimal for the ¯rm to restrict liquidity of the controlling block entirely, by say,
not listing the ¯rm on an exchange, or prohibiting resale. Under other con¯gurations it
may be optimal to make the controlling block and all other shares fully liquid. It may
even be desirable to force \exit" of all shareholders (this can be achieved for example by
writing so called drag-along agreements, whereby venture capitalists are required to sell
their stake in a ¯rm when it is put up for sale). Our analysis thus indicates that there is
not always a trade-o® between liquidity and control.
More speci¯cally, we ¯nd that greater liquidity brings about greater control when:
(i) the number of ex-post investment opportunities for the VC fund is high; (ii) a large
amount of funds is supplied to the VC industry, so that the ex-ante opportunity cost of VC
investments in the portfolio ¯rm is low, and (iii) the valuation of the ¯rm in a sale re°ects
the ¯rm's fundamentals accurately. Each of these conditions appears to have been met
in the past ¯fteen years in the US. In particular, our analysis reconciles the evidence on
the increasing number of IPOs and that on the average holding period of VC investments
(our point (ii)): namely, as a result of the increase in the °ow of funds towards VCs,
the cost of capital of VC funds has been reduced; this allowed VCs to make more liquid
investments by taking bigger stakes in each venture; indeed, with more liquidity bigger
stakes are required to preserve VCs incentives to actively monitor their entrepreneurs.
Next, when endogeneizing potential buyers'or underwriters' incentives to gather spec-
ulative information, we ¯nd that it is optimal to provide speculative monitors with options
to buy equity. This also is consistent with the evidence on exit in venture capital ¯nanc-
ing; in particular, most venture capital ¯rms in the US, either go public or end up being
acquired by larger ¯rms. We thus show that when companies decide to go public in order
to create more liquidity they choose to do so by issuing equity rather than debt even if this
involves a higher dilution cost. The basic reason is that equity creates greater incentives
4for speculative monitoring by potential buyers or underwriters than debt, and therefore
the price of equity in the secondary market better re°ects the information generated by
the active monitor than the price of debt (see Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Boot
and Thakor (1997) for related observations).
There is a growing theoretical literature on Venture Capital, but to our knowledge,
our paper is the ¯rst to focus on the design of exit clauses. There is, however, a small
related theoretical literature on \exit" in Corporate Finance. The most closely related
models to ours are by Kahn and Winton (1998) and Maug (1998). They also analyze the
impact of a liquid stock market on monitoring by large block-holders, but their models in
contrast to ours have small investors who face liquidity shocks and large investors who do
not. Also these papers do not take a mechanism design approach to the optimal design of
liquidity.
More recently, the model of Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (1999) also emphasizes the
possible complementarity between active monitoring and secondary market valuation at
the IPO stage. However, their paper also does not take a mechanism design approach
aiming at determining the optimal level of liquidity, exit options and compensation struc-
tures for the di®erent participants. Our concern here is to characterize the solution to an
optimal contracting problem subject to incentive and individual rationality constraints for
the various parties, and to show how this solution depends on the underlying parameters
of the problem5.
While our optimal contracting approach is most appropriate for private ownership
settings it can also shed new light on public ownership environments. First, corporations
can enter agreements with large block holders that mimic some of the incentive and exit
possibilities designed for a venture capitalist. Second, our paper provides a framework for
assessing the impact of existing legal and regulatory constraints on insiders' exit.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the general
framework: a principal, acting on behalf of uninformed investors, an entrepreneur, an
5The optimal design of the active monitor's (or VC fund's) contract, is a non-standard dynamic
contracting problem that combines moral hazard with a Diamond- Dybvig (1983) type liquidity problem.
5active monitor (or venture capitalist) who can exert e®ort in order to reduce the manager's
rents from shirking, and a speculative monitor who can acquire information about the
¯rm's future performance. The active monitor is subject to liquidity shocks, and therefore
may value contractual arrangements that provide him with an exit option prior to the
payback stage where the ¯rm's revenues are realized. Section 3 ¯rst characterizes the
optimal contract for the active monitor and provides su±cient conditions under which this
contract is liquid and allows her to sell her claims whenever she faces a liquidity shock.
It then characterizes the optimal contract for the speculative monitor and analyzes how
the two monitoring problems interact. Finally, Section 4 discusses various extensions and
robustness checks, and derives some implications of our analysis for the design of venture
capital agreements.
2 Basic Model
We divide time into three main phases or periods:
² a start-up stage t = 0, where contracts are structured and investments made,
² a pay-back stage t = 2, where the ¯rm's revenues are realized and,
² a trading stage t = 1, where the ¯rm's initial investors may sell their stake to new
investors.
Our analysis focuses mainly on the intermediate stage: whether and how stakes can
be sold to new investors and more generally how the liquidity of initial investments should
be designed. Before we turn to a description of the mechanism design problem we need
to specify the ¯rm's technology, preferences of participants (entrepreneur and investors)
and their information structures.
62.1 The ¯rm's technology
At date t = 0 the ¯rm sets up a project at cost I > 0. This project generates a random
veri¯able cash °ow in period t = 2 of
e R =
8
> <
> :
r with probability 1 ¡ p
r + ¢ with probability p; (1)
where r > 0 and ¢ > 0. The project is run by an entrepreneur who can a®ect the cash
°ow outcome through her actions. This is modeled by letting the probability p be an
endogenous variable. It can take two values, p 2 fpL;pHg where:
² p = pL = 0 if the entrepreneur shirks6,
² p = pH > 0 if she is diligent.
When the entrepreneur shirks she gets a private bene¯t denoted by ¯ > 0 . To induce
her not to shirk she would need to receive a ¯nancial reward, which compensates her
for the loss of private bene¯ts ¯. Compensating her for the full loss of private bene¯ts
may be too costly and a cheaper way of inducing her to work hard may be to monitor
her actions. We shall allow for both ¯nancial incentives and monitoring to overcome this
incentive problem.
2.2 Investors
Besides the entrepreneur, who is essential to run the project, there are potentially three
types of investors involved in the ¯rm:
² uninformed investors, e.g. limited partners in a venture capital fund, who limit their
involvement to a passive ¯nancial investment,
6The assumption pL = 0 ensures that the active monitor always wants to exit at date t = 1 when he
has shirked. Our results extend with minor modi¯cations to the general case where pL > 0, but since in
this case it is possible that the active monitor may prefer not to exit at date t = 1 when he shirks, the
derivation of the optimal contract is slightly more involved.
7² an active monitor, e.g. the general partner in a venture capital fund, henceforth
labelled `venture capitalist', who takes a more active role and monitors the en-
trepreneur, and
² a speculative monitor, e.g. a buyer, an underwriter, or a speculator, who may
gather information on the ¯rm's performance from the outside and make speculative
investments in period t = 1 if shares are issued or sold.
All parties are risk-neutral. Uninformed investors and the speculative monitor have
no binding wealth constraint. In contrast, the entrepreneur has no initial wealth, and the
active monitor faces an opportunity cost of funds (even very wealthy venture capitalists
or bankers do not have enough wealth to be able to invest in all investment opportunities
that are open to them). Thus, we assume that the active monitor can free up funds for
the project at a positive opportunity cost ¹0 > 1 as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and
that any residual ¯nancing at date t = 0 is provided by uninformed investors. We also
assume that the entrepreneur and active monitor are protected by limited liability.
The role of the entrepreneur and uninformed investors in our model is straightforward.
The role and objectives of the active and speculative monitors are less standard and require
further elaboration.
1. The active monitor: The role of the active monitor in our model is to reduce the
entrepreneur's private bene¯ts from shirking by supervising her actions. This is
modeled by assuming that when the entrepreneur is not monitored her private ben-
e¯ts are ¯ = B. But when she is actively supervised by an active monitor her
private bene¯ts are reduced to ¯ = b < B. The interpretation is that by supervising
the entrepreneur the active monitor can reduce her scope for diversion of funds.
Active monitoring, however, involves a private cost c > 0 for the monitor. It will
only take place if the monitor has a ¯nancial incentive, which compensates him
for incurring these costs. To simplify the strategic interaction between the active
monitor and entrepreneur as much as possible we suppose that the monitor's decision
8to supervise or not is observed by the entrepreneur before she chooses her action.
Thus, if the active monitor decides not to supervise the entrepreneur she will simply
shirk7.
The core economic issue in our model relating to active monitoring arises from
the tension between two objectives: i) providing the active monitor with e±cient
¯nancial incentives to monitor, and ii) letting the active monitor hold as liquid a
stake as possible. We model the monitor's demand for liquidity by assuming that
he is subject to liquidity shocks: with some probability the monitor would prefer to
unwind his investment in the ¯rm in period t = 1 in order to reinvest the proceeds
in a more pro¯table investment opportunity. More formally we assume that the
active monitor's date t = 1 utility function is given by:
u(c1;c2) =
8
> <
> :
¹1c1 + c2 with probability ¸
c1 + c2 with probability (1 ¡ ¸) (2)
where ¹1 > 1 is the scarcity value of funds for the active monitor at date t = 1
if an alternative and more pro¯table investment opportunity arises at that date.
This event, which we may refer to as a \liquidity shock" occurs with probability ¸.
When a more pro¯table investment opportunity arises the active monitor obviously
prefers to unwind his investment in the ¯rm at date t = 1. We need to assume that
¹1 is not too large. Speci¯cally we assume that:
¹0 > ¸¹1 + (1 ¡ ¸)
Otherwise, an arbitrage opportunity exists between uninformed investors and the
active monitor.
The problem with unwinding the active monitor's investment early is that in period
t = 1 the ¯nal realized value of cash °ows is not known perfectly. As a result it is
more di±cult or more expensive to provide adequate ¯nancial incentives to the active
7We implicitly restrict the analysis to parameter values for which the entrepreneur cannot get ¯nancing
if left unmonitored.
9monitor to supervise the entrepreneur. To see this, imagine that nothing is known
about realized cash °ows at date t = 1. Then, if the active monitor is allowed to sell
his stake in that period at its expected present value he gets no ¯nancial reward for
actively monitoring the entrepreneur whenever he quits in period t = 1. To preserve
incentives for active monitoring, it is thus essential to bring the information about
realized cash °ows in period t = 2 forward to period t = 1. This can be done by
\speculative investors" who monitor the ¯rm from the outside.
2. The speculative monitor. His role is to assess the value of the ¯rm at date t = 1.
At that time all actions have already been chosen and the probability distribution
over future cash °ows is determined. When he monitors, he receives a high or a low
signal about future cash °ows. We denote by qH (respectively qL) the probability
of receiving a high signal, when the entrepreneur has chosen the high e®ort level pH
(respectively low e®ort level pL = 0).
For simplicity, we assume that realized cash °ows are a su±cient statistic for man-
agerial e®ort; in other words, that the speculator's signal conveys no new informa-
tion beyond that contained in the ¯nal return. This implies that the only role of
speculative monitoring is to bring information forward in time and not to provide
supplementary information to ¯ne tune entrepreneurial incentives. Let ¾ 2 (1=2;1)
denote the conditional probability that the signal matches the return. Then we
have:
qi = pi¾ + (1 ¡ pi)(1 ¡ ¾): (3)
Our assumption that cash °ows are a su±cient statistic for managerial e®ort implies
that the likelihood ratios on observing respectively a high ¯nal cash °ow realization
and a high signal at date t = 1 are ranked as follows:
pH ¡ pL
pH
>
qH ¡ qL
qH
. (4)
10We denote the likelihood ratios at respective dates t = 1 and t = 2 by
¤q =
qH ¡ qL
qH
and ¤p =
pH ¡ pL
pH
= 1.
The closer ¤q gets to ¤p = 1, the better the quality of the signal generated by spec-
ulative monitoring, that is the more e®ective speculative monitoring is at producing
information about the ¯rm's performance.
We shall analyze the optimal contract for the active monitor in a ¯rst stage and
take the existence of a signal at date t = 1 as given. We only consider the endogenous
production of this signal by speculative monitors in a second stage.
2.3 Information structures and the timing of moves
There are three incentive problems in our model. First, the entrepreneur's problem, which
results from the unobservability of her choice of e®ort. Second, the active monitor's
problem. His decision about whether to supervise the entrepreneur is observable by the
entrepreneur but by no one else. Furthermore, the active monitor has private information
about his liquidity need. Third, the speculative monitor's problem: his decision to monitor
and the signal he observes are private information, so that he must be given ¯nancial
rewards to induce him both to monitor and reveal his information truthfully.
The timing of moves of the di®erent participants is as follows:
² At date t = 0; the uninformed investors, the entrepreneur and the active monitor
sign a comprehensive contract specifying how the contracting parties are compen-
sated as a function of the revenue outcome at date t = 2 and of the information that
is reported by the active and speculative monitors at date t = 1. We assume that the
principal, acting on behalf of uninformed investors, makes the ex ante contractual
proposals to the other parties (entrepreneur, active and speculative monitor)8.
8No change would arise if, as is sometimes done in the existing literature, we assumed instead that
the owner of the technology is the contract designer.
11² Once the contract is signed and the investment project set up, the active monitor
chooses whether to supervise the entrepreneur.
² Following the active monitor's choice the entrepreneur decides whether to shirk.
As mentioned above, she observes the active monitor's choice before taking that
decision.
² Following these action choices, the active monitor learns (privately) at date t = 1
whether he faces a liquidity shock, that is whether the scarcity value of his funds at
date t = 1 is equal to ¹1 or 1. In case he announces a liquidity shock, the contract
may call for the services of a speculative monitor to value the active monitor's claims
and specify a compensation for the active monitor at date t = 1 on the basis of the
speculative monitor's report q 2 fqL;qHg9. The active monitor has no information
about the outcome of speculative monitoring when declaring whether he faces a
liquidity shock. We denote by Ã > 0 the cost of generating a speculative signal.
² Finally, at date t = 2 returns are realized and all parties are compensated as a
function of the publicly observable realized returns and (when available) the previous
period's reports of the active and speculative monitors.
We shall implicitly restrict our analysis to parameter values such that the net pledge-
able income to uninformed investors is positive when the entrepreneur is actively moni-
tored and consequently chooses p = pH, but is negative when no active monitoring takes
place and the entrepreneur shirks10.
2.4 Feasible contracts
Throughout most of the paper we shall assume that the contracting parties can commit to
a long-term contract. We do not impose any restrictions on the set of feasible contracts. In
9Although for reasons of convenience the contracting problem is set up so that the conditional services
of a speculative monitor are already committed at date t = 0, the problem could easily be modi¯ed to
allow for contracting with a speculative monitor only as of date t = 1.
10See footnote 13 below for a more formal statement of this assumption.
12particular, monetary transfers can be made contingent on any observable variable. That
is, they can be a function of the ¯nal revenue outcome (at date t = 2) and the information
that is reported by active and speculative monitors at date t = 1. The contract must only
satisfy the usual incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and/or limited liability
constraints. In Section 4 we brie°y discuss how the possibility of contract renegotiation
at date t = 1; a®ects the e±cient outcome. There is no loss of generality in considering
optimal compensation contracts for each agent separately. We begin with the entrepreneur
and the active monitor:
1. The entrepreneur's compensation contract: Given our assumptions on the
entrepreneur's preferences and the informativeness of signals at date t = 1; the
entrepreneur's optimal compensation package actually takes a very simple form.
Since the entrepreneur is risk neutral and does not face any liquidity shock, and since
signals at date t = 1 are less informative about the entrepreneur's choice of action
than cash °ow realizations at date t = 2, it is optimal to defer the entrepreneur's
compensation entirely to date t = 2 and not pay him anything before cash °ow is
realized. The entrepreneur's payment at date t = 2 then depends on the cash °ow
realization. We denote these by Re(r) and Re(r + ¢) respectively.
To provide incentives to work the entrepreneur should be rewarded for high cash
°ow and punished for low cash °ow realizations. But since he is wealth-constrained
and protected by limited liability the maximum punishment in the event of a low
return is to pay him 0. Thus, the entrepreneur's compensation boils down to a
single, strictly positive number: Re(r + ¢) ´ Re.
2. The active monitor's compensation contract: To insure the active monitor
against liquidity shocks it may be optimal to pay him a positive transfer at date
t = 1 on the basis of the realized (and truthfully reported) speculative signal. Again,
to have incentives to monitor he should be rewarded only when a high signal at date
t = 1 or a high cash °ow at date t = 2 is realized (and he should receive nothing
13in the events of a low signal or a low cash °ow outcome). Thus, his compensation
contract has at most four strictly positive transfers fra(¹1);Ra(¹1);ra(1);Ra(1)g,
where:
(a) ra(¹1) denotes the active monitor's payo® at date t = 1 contingent on a high
signal when he reports a liquidity shock or scarcity value of funds of ¹1 > 1;
(b) Ra(¹1) denotes the date t = 2 transfer contingent on a high cash °ow realization
when he reports ¹1;
(c) ra(1) denotes the active monitor's payo® at date t = 1 when he truthfully
reports no liquidity shock; as we shall argue below (see footnote 10), it is
(weakly) optimal to set ra(1) = 0 since signals at date t = 1 are less informative
than cash °ows; hence, we shall use the less cumbersome notation ra to denote
the active monitor's date t = 1 payo® when he reports a liquidity shock, that
is: ra = ra(¹1);
(d) Ra(1) denotes the date t = 2 transfer contingent on a high cash °ow realization
when he reports no liquidity shock.
3 The liquidity/monitoring trade-o®.
Before turning to a characterization of the active monitor's optimal contract consider
brie°y the entrepreneur's incentive problem. Given that he has been actively monitored
the entrepreneur is better o® working than shirking if and only if:
pHR
e ¸ pLR
e + b (5)
This incentive constraint ties down exactly the required minimum transfer that induces
the entrepreneur to work:
R
e ¸
b
pH ¡ pL
=
b
pH
: (6)
143.1 The active monitor's contract
The active monitor's incentive problem is a non-standard dynamic moral hazard problem
because it has a stochastically evolving opportunity cost of funds and the realized value at
date t = 1 is private information. Viewed from another perspective the active monitor's
problem here is a combination of a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) type liquidity problem
and a moral hazard problem.
3.1.1 The active monitor's incentive problem
The optimization problem with respect to transfers to the active monitor can be set up
as a cost minimization problem subject to an individual rationality constraint and to two
incentive constraints. The individual rationality constraint guarantees that the amount
Ia initially invested in the project by the active monitor times the scarcity value ¹0 is less
than or equal to his expected utility Ua under the contract. The ¯rst incentive constraint
guarantees that the monitor actively monitors the entrepreneur. The second that he
truthfully reports his liquidity shock.
More formally, using the fact that the individual rationality constraint of the active
monitor is binding in equilibrium11, and letting P a denote the expected monetary payment
to the active monitor, an optimal contract for the venture capitalist, is one that minimizes
the net expected cost of active monitoring, namely:
P
a ¡ I
a;
where Ia is the active monitor's investment in the project. The individual rationality
constraint of the active monitor is binding when Ia = 1
¹0Ua, where ¹0 is the scarcity value
of venture capital funds and Ua is the expected gross utility of the active monitor if he
signs the contract. We have:
² Ua = ¸(qH¹1ra + pHRa(¹1)) + (1 ¡ ¸)pHRa(1) ¡ c and
11If this constraint were not binding, then the Principal could increase his net expected value by slightly
reducing ra;Ra(1); and Ra(¹1) in such a way that both the individual rationality constraint and the two
incentive constraints of the active monitor remain satis¯ed.
15² Pa = ¸(qHra + pHRa(¹1)) + (1 ¡ ¸)pHRa(1);
Therefore, we can express the optimal contracting problem for the active monitor as
the following minimization problem:
min
fra;Ra(¹1);Ra(1)g
f¸[qH(1 ¡
¹1
¹0)ra + pH(1 ¡ 1
¹0)Ra(¹1)] + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ 1
¹0)pHRa(1)g
subject to:
¸[qH¹1r
a + pHR
a(¹1)] + (1 ¡ ¸)pHR
a(1) ¡ c ¸ ¸qL¹1r
a + (1 ¡ ¸)qLr
a, (7)
and 8
> <
> :
qH¹1ra + pHRa(¹1) ¸ pHRa(1) (a)
pHRa(1) ¸ qHra + pHRa(¹1) (b)
9
> =
> ;
(8)
The ¯rst constraint (7), is the active monitor's ex ante incentive constraint with respect
to monitoring e®ort. The RHS of this constraint re°ects the fact that a shirking monitor
has the option to exit at date t = 1 in order to evade the negative consequences from
shirking by getting out before anyone is aware of his misconduct. He chooses to exercise
this option whenever ra > 0 since in that case his payo® from exiting qLra is greater than
his payo® from staying, which is just equal to zero when he chooses pL = 0. The second
set of constraints (8) ensure truthful reporting of the liquidity shock conditional on not
shirking12.
It is easy to see that at the optimum, constraint (7) is always binding. Indeed, if it
were not then the obvious solution to the subconstrained program in which (7) is ignored
is ra = Ra(¹1) = Ra(1) = 0. But this solution clearly violates constraint (7).
12Assuming that the active monitor's reward ra(1) in the absence of a liquidity shock is equal to zero,
involves no loss of optimality. To see this, note that since
qH¡qL
qH <
pH¡pL
pH a move from a contract with
ra(1) > 0 to a contract with ra(1) = 0 , keeping the expected transfer to the active monitor conditional
upon not shirking constant, relaxes both incentive constraints. Therefore the optimal contract is such
that ra(1) = 0.
163.1.2 Optimal liquidity design
Using the fact that (7) is binding at the optimum, and then substituting for (1¡¸)pHRa(1)
from (7) into the principal's objective function, we can reformulate the above program as:
min
fra¸0;Ra(¹1)¸0g
f[¸(1 ¡
¹1
¹0
)qH ¡ ¸(1 ¡
1
¹0
)¹1(qH ¡ qL) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡
1
¹0
)qL]r
a +
c
¹0
g
subject to:
8
> <
> :
qH¹1ra + pHRa(¹1) ¸ pHRa(1) (a)
pHRa(1) ¸ qHra + pHRa(¹1) (b)
9
> =
> ;
. (9)
Now, let
¹
¤ =
¸qH + (1 ¡ 1
¹0)(1 ¡ ¸)qL
¸[
qH
¹0 + (1 ¡ 1
¹0)(qH ¡ qL)]
,
then when ¹1 < ¹¤, it is straightforward to verify that the term in square brackets in
the objective function is positive, so that it is optimal to set ra = 0 and Ra(1) = Ra(¹1).
On the other hand, if ¹1 ¸ ¹¤, it is optimal to set ra as large as possible, subject to (8).
This in turn implies that the second constraint in (8) is binding at the optimum.
This result is not too surprising. When ¹1 is close to 1 the active monitor is essentially
indi®erent as to when he gets paid. Giving him an exit option by o®ering him a liquid
contract with ra > 0, would then worsen the monitoring incentive problem without yield-
ing any substantial liquidity bene¯ts13. When ¹1 is large, on the other hand, providing
the active monitor with an exit option may increase his monitoring incentives14.
We can now solve for the active monitor's optimal contract. We consider in turn the
case of a patient ( ¹1 < ¹¤) and an impatient ( ¹1 > ¹¤) active monitor.
13More precisely, for ¹1 close to 1, we have
¹1(
qH ¡ qL
qH
) <
pH ¡ pL
pH
= 1.
Then, if ra > 0 one can lower qHra by some amount dr, while at the same time increasing pHRa(¹1)
by ¹1(
qH¡qL
qH )dr < dr, without violating the e®ort incentive constraint of the active monitor. In other
words, relying on second period returns provides higher powered incentives to the active monitor than
relying on the ¯rst period signal generated by speculative monitoring.
14In particular, for ¹1 large, we have: ¹1(
qH¡qL
qL ) >
pH¡pL
pL = 1; so that relying on the speculative
signal at date t = 1 provides higher powered e®ort incentives to the active monitor than relying on date
t = 2 returns.
171. Patient monitor case: ¹1 < ¹¤:
(a) We have seen that, in this case, the optimal contract is illiquid, with ra = 0
and Ra(¹1) = Ra(1) = c
pH, and the principal's expected cost from hiring an
active monitor is:
C
IL
A = (1 ¡
1
¹0
)c +
c
¹0
= c;
where the superscript IL stands for \Illiquid".
2. Impatient monitor case: ¹1 > ¹¤:
In this case we know that constraint (8b) is binding, that is:
R
a(1) =
qH
pH
r
a + R
a(¹1):
Using this together with the active monitor's e®ort incentive constraint, which we
can rewrite as:
(qH ¡ qL)(¸¹1 + 1 ¡ ¸)r
a + pHR
a(¹1) = c; (10)
one can substitute for Ra(1) and ra in the principal's objective function, so that the above
minimization program reduces to:
min
Ra(¹1)
fFR
a(¹1) +
c
¹0
g
where,
F = (1 ¡
1
¹0
) ¡
[¸(1 ¡
¹1
¹0) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ 1
¹0)]qH
(qH ¡ qL)(¸¹1 + 1 ¡ ¸)
:
It is easy to check that F is positive whenever ¹1 > ¹¤. It is thus optimal to set
R
a(¹1) = 0, r
a =
c
(qH ¡ qL)(¸¹1 + 1 ¡ ¸)
and R
a(1) =
qH
pH
r
a,
with a resulting cost for the principal - including the expected cost of acquiring the
speculative signal ¸Ã at date t = 1- equal to:
18C
L
A =
[¸(1 ¡
¹1
¹0) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ 1
¹0)]c
[¸¹1 + (1 ¡ ¸)]¤q
+
c
¹0
+ ¸Ã; (11)
where the superscript L stands for \liquid"15,16.
Now, if we rewrite the cut-o® level of impatience ¹¤ as:
¹
¤ =
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ 1
¹0)(1 ¡ ¤q)
¸[¤q(1 ¡ 1
¹0) + 1
¹0]
;
one can immediately verify that when Ã = 0; CL
A ￿ CIL
A if and only if ¹1 ¸ ¹¤. More
generally, combining our analyses of the patient and the impatient active monitor cases,
we obtain the following central result:
Proposition 1 : There exists a cut-o® opportunity cost b ¹ ¸ ¹¤,
where ¹¤ =
¸+(1¡¸)(1¡ 1
¹0
)(1¡¤q)
¸[¤q(1¡ 1
¹0
)+ 1
¹0
] , such that:
(a) It is optimal to o®er a liquid contract with ra > 0 and Ra(¹1) = 0 when ¹1 > b ¹,
and to o®er an illiquid contract with ra = 0 otherwise17.
(b) The cut-o® opportunity cost b ¹ above which the optimal contract of the active
monitor becomes liquid, is a decreasing function of both ¸ and ¤q and it is an increasing
function of ¹0 and Ã.
(c) b ¹ > ¹¤ for Ã > 0.
Proof: see the discussion above.
The intuition behind our comparative statics results is as follows. First, the higher
is ¸, the probability of a liquidity shock at date t = 1, the higher the active monitor's
15The assumption that the ¯rm's pledgeable income is positive if and only if the entrepreneur is actively
monitored, can now formally be expressed by the inequalities:
r + pH¢ ¡ Ã ¡ minfCIL
A ;CL
Ag ¡ b > I > r.
16Note that if the assumption ¹0 > ¸¹1 + (1 ¡ ¸) which ruled out the possibility of arbitrage between
uninformed investors and the active monitor, is violated, then it is optimal to set ra =
¤qpHRa(1)
qH = +1,
so that CL
A = ¡1 !
17Throughout this section, we implicitly restrict attention to values of ¹1 such that ¹0 > ¸¹1+(1¡¸),
so that there is no arbitrage between uninformed investors and the active monitor. Thus, liquid contracts
are actually optimal for ¹1 2 [b ¹;
¹0¡(1¡¸)
¸ ) and they are never optimal whenever this interval is empty.
19preference for liquidity and therefore the higher the bene¯ts from providing him with
an exit option. Second, the higher ¤q the lower the increase in agency cost involved in
o®ering a liquid instead of an illiquid contract. Third, the comparative statics result
with respect to ¹0, the scarcity value of venture capital funds at date t = 0, are driven
by the considerations that, as the principal must pay more to attract venture capital
(¹0 goes up), he is less willing to o®er the more expensive liquid contract. Note that a
liquid contract raises both the date t = 1 and t = 2 payments and the active monitor's
investment contribution at date t = 0.
Our comparative statics results with respect to ¹0 may thus provide an explanation
for the recently observed reduction in the average age of technology start-ups before they
go public. Our explanation would be that as more money °ows into the venture capital
industry the terms demanded by Venture Capital funds go down (in terms of our model ¹0
goes down) and therefore the relative costs of o®ering the more e±cient liquid contracts
go down. This is an alternative explanation to the one that is commonly given that ¯rms
tend to go public sooner because the market for IPOs is currently very hot. Note that
these two explanations are not inconsistent. Also, unfortunately, disentangling the two
e®ects empirically appears to be very di±cult.
3.2 The speculative monitor's contract
So far we have taken the existence of a signal of the ¯rm's future cash °ow at date t = 1 as
given. In practice, however, information about future cash °ows is acquired endogenously
by various market participants, which we have labelled \speculative monitors". As we
noted earlier this information can be acquired only at cost Ã > 0. Also, whether a
speculative monitor actually sinks the cost to obtain this signal is private information.
In addition, the signal he observes is also private information. Therefore, the principal
must design a contract with the speculative monitor that induces him to both gather and
truthfully reveal his information.
When designing this contract the principal has to evaluate the speculator's incentives
20in response to all possible action choices by the active monitor. We begin by characterizing
the optimal contract in response to the choice of action pH by the active monitor. We
then consider the speculator's incentives in response to the active monitor's choice of
pL under the latter contract and show that multiple equilibria may obtain under that
contract for the speculator and under the contract characterized in proposition 1 for the
active monitor. Finally, we show how the active monitor's contract must be modi¯ed to
ensure unique implementation of the second best outcome.
3.2.1 An optimal contract
As it turns out, the speculative monitor's contract can take a very simple form in our
model. The principal can o®er the speculative monitor a call option (which expires at
the end of period 1) allowing him to purchase a fraction s of the ¯rm's shares at an
exercise price e. As we show below, there is a range of values fs;eg such that: i) the
speculative monitor is induced to monitor and reveal truthfully his observed signal and
ii) his individual rationality constraint is binding.
The exercise price e should be set so that the speculative monitor prefers not to exercise
if he gets a low (L) signal, but exercises the option if the signal is high (H).
In other words, the exercise price e must satisfy the condition:
m
H
H ¸
e ¡ r
¢
¸ m
L
H (12)
where,
m
H
H =
¾pH
¾pH + (1 ¡ pH)(1 ¡ ¾)
; and m
L
H =
pH(1 ¡ ¾)
pH(1 ¡ ¾) + (1 ¡ pH)¾
;
are the probabilities of a high date t = 2 cash °ow conditional on observing, respectively,
signals H and L. Since ¾ > 1=2, the conditional probabilities are such that mH
H > mL
H.
It is therefore possible to ¯nd an exercise price e satisfying condition (12). Under this
contract, exercising the option is tantamount to (truthfully) revealing the signal H and
not exercising to revealing L.
21Having obtained the option, the speculative monitor has an incentive to pay the ac-
quisition cost Ã in order to obtain an informative signal if and only if:
qH(m
H
H¢ + r ¡ e)s ¡ Ã ¸ maxf0;pH¢ + r ¡ egs. (13)
Finally, his individual rationality constraint is given by
qH(m
H
H¢ + r ¡ e)s ¡ Ã ¸ 0. (14)
As long as pH¢+r > e, the incentive constraint (13) can be relaxed by increasing the
exercise price e. Therefore, the exercise price that minimizes the required amount s of
shares pledged to the speculative monitor is obtained by setting e = pH¢+r, substituting
this value in (13) and solving18:
qH(m
H
H ¡ pH)¢s = Ã.
Thus, under this contract the speculative monitor makes zero net expected pro¯ts and
the principal pays an expected cost Ã to obtain the date t = 1 signal. We summarize this
discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 An optimal incentive contract for the speculative monitor is a call option
with exercise price: e = pH¢ + r; and number of shares: s =
Ã
qH(mH
H¡pH)¢:
Proof: See the discussion above.
This proposition establishes that it is (weakly) optimal to provide the speculative
monitor with options to purchase equity at date t = 1. In particular, issuing (safe) debt
instead of equity in a public o®ering at date t = 1 is suboptimal because it does not provide
the buyers or underwriters of the issue any incentive to acquire information about the
future value of the ¯rm. In other words, going public by issuing safe debt would deprive
the ¯rm of valuable signals, which would improve the incentive contract with the active
18Intuitively, any option obtained for free with exercise price such that pH¢ + r > e would give a
free gift to the speculative monitor even if he does no monitoring. To maximize incentives it is best to
eliminate this gift.
22monitor. Thus, our analysis provides one explanation for why ¯rms typically choose to
go public by issuing equity and not debt, as a Myers and Majluf (1984) type analysis
would predict. If an important goal of ¯rms going public is to obtain information about
its future value from equilibrium prices in the secondary market then these ¯rms may be
prepared to pay a dilution cost to obtain this information.
3.2.2 Multiple equilibria and unique implementation
Unfortunately, the optimal contracts for the active and speculative monitor derived above
do not always uniquely implement the second best outcome. Indeed, multiple equilibria
may obtain under these contracts. Speci¯cally, an ine±cient equilibrium in which the
active monitor chooses low e®ort, and the speculative monitor does not invest in informa-
tion may exist along with the e±cient equilibrium. To see this, observe that if the active
monitor is expected to choose pL = 0, it is optimal for the speculative monitor never to
exercise the call option and therefore not to acquire any information. Conversely, if the
speculative monitor is not expected to exercise the call option then the active monitor's
best response may be to choose pL = 0 instead of pH. This is the case whenever19:
pHR
a(1) < c (15)
Note that this condition is consistent with the active monitor's e®ort incentive constraint
(10). Both conditions can hold in particular when ¸ and/or ¹1 are large. Thus, if
conditions (10) and (15) both hold there exists an ine±cient equilibrium along with the
e±cient equilibrium characterized above.
The principal could stop here and hope for the best, or he could modify the active
monitor's contract to ensure unique implementation of the e±cient equilibrium.
Unique implementation requires that the active monitor's e®ort incentive constraint
(7) as well as
pHR
a(1)) ¸ c (16)
19The LHS of this condition, re°ects the fact that an active monitor who anticipates no speculative
monitoring to take place, will systematically announce no liquidity shock; this, in turn, follows from the
fact that Ra(¹1) = 0 if the contract is liquid, as shown in Section 3.1 above.
23be satis¯ed under the optimal contract20.
When
¤q(¸¹1 + 1 ¡ ¸) ￿ 1
constraint (16) is automatically satis¯ed by the optimal contract for the active monitor
derived in Proposition 1, so that there is a unique e±cient equilibrium under this contract.
On the other hand, when the opposite inequality holds,
¤q(¸¹1 + 1 ¡ ¸) > 1
then the active monitor's contract must be derived under the additional constraint (16)
which of course will be binding in this case. Yet, as shown in the Appendix, the analysis
in section 3.1 remains essentially valid and the optimal contract turns out to be similar
to the one derived in Proposition 1. The main substantive di®erence is that it may be
optimal to reduce liquidity to strengthen the active monitor's incentives.
4 Discussion
We begin by discussing informally a number of directions in which the theory can be
extended.
4.1 Extensions
(a)Hot-issue markets
Decisions to go public are in°uenced by the ease of fund-raising; indeed the vast
majority of IPOs occur at market peaks (Lerner 1994). IPOs do well in hot-issue markets
presumably because they create stores of value in states in which loanable funds are plenty
and stores of value scarce.
20When both constraints are satis¯ed it is a dominant strategy for the active monitor to choose pH
so that the ine±cient equilibrium is eliminated. An alternative potential way of achieving unique imple-
mentation could be to make information acquisition and truthful revelation by the speculative monitor
a dominant strategy. But this is not possible when pL = 0, for then there is no valuable information to
be collected by the speculative monitor. If, however, pL > 0 then it is possible and desirable to achieve
unique implementation by selling a put (instead of a call) option on the ¯rm to the speculative monitor
under which it is a dominant strategy for the speculator to acquire the date t = 1 signal.
24Formally, the aggregate shock determining whether the market is hot or cold, can be
introduced into our model by letting the price that uninformed investors are willing to
pay at date t = 1 for a share yielding a unit expected income at date t = 2 vary across
states of nature. We can then consider two cases. In the ¯rst case, contracts contingent on
the realization of the macroeconomic shock can be written at date t = 0. The analysis is
then a straightforward extension of that in Section 3. The new insight obtained from this
analysis is that the liquidity of the active monitor's claim may now be contingent on the
realization of the macroeconomic shock: An IPO being more pro¯table in a hot market, it
may be optimal to make the active monitor's claim be liquid in the event of a hot market
at date t = 1 and illiquid in the event of a cold market. Note that in contrast to the
predictions of a standard moral hazard incentive problem the active monitor's expected
payo® may then depend on a (macroeconomic) variable he has no control over.
When the macroeconomic shock is observable but not directly veri¯able, it is still the
case that some information about this shock can be recovered from the price that shares
fetch at the IPO. For example, one can let the active monitor decide whether to go public
at date t = 1, and if he chooses so, reward him only if the sale price is very high, meaning
that he is likely to have monitored and the market is hot. This makes the active monitor's
reward in case of exit even more nonlinear (although not more risky).
(b) Renegotiation
We have assumed that the initial plan designed at the outset is always implemented
and that there is no renegotiation. Established venture capitalists may be able to build
a reputation for abiding by the initial plan or create an underlying situation where they
have no alternative but to stick to the plan by choosing not to line up prospective future
buyers at the time of contracting. In general, however, renegotiation cannot be ruled out.
It may thus be worth enriching the model by looking at whether the parties would not
want to renegotiate to their mutual bene¯t during the course of their relationship, and,
if so, how exit design would be altered.
Renegotiation has no impact if the optimal contract is a liquid one since the allocation
25is then ex post e±cient. In contrast, the illiquid contract is ex post ine±cient since the
active monitor keeps his stake until date 2 even when he faces a liquidity shock. As is often
the case in optimal contracting, ex ante incentives are created by an ex post distortion
that the parties will want to renegotiate away. The parties here have an incentive when
date t = 1 comes to agree to let the active monitor exit at that date at a discount
relative to the value of his long term claim. The possibility of such renegotiation would
then bring about more liquidity than would be desirable from an ex-ante perspective21.
It is conceivable that adequately balanced regulatory intervention limiting exit at date
t = 1, perhaps of the kind envisioned by Co®ee (1991) and others, might then provide an
e±ciency improving countervailing force.
(c) IPO underpricing
Our model has not made any assumption as to how the sale of shares proceeds. In par-
ticular, underpricing may occur if the IPO auction exhibits rationing as in Rock (1986).
The level of underpricing will in general depend on the asymmetry of information between
investors and the speculator. If this asymmetry of information covaries with the uncer-
tainty about the quality of active monitoring (a covariation that can easily be built into
the theoretical framework), then underpricing is less pronounced when the active monitor
is more reputable, as the evidence for the venture capital industry by Barry, Muscarella,
Peavy and Vetsuypens (1990) suggests.
4.2 Exit design in venture capital agreements
Our model can be interpreted in several di®erent ways. One interpretation is that the
active monitor is a CEO of a publicly traded ¯rm. The CEO is expected to remain a
limited time on the job, but his decisions and monitoring activities may have long run
e®ects on the performance of the corporation. In designing the CEO's compensation
21See Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), Ma (1991) and Matthews (1995) for an analysis of renegotiation
in a dynamic optimal contracting problem with moral hazard. Their analyses apply to our problem
with small modi¯cations (to include liquidity shocks). One might expect from their analyses that the
anticipation of renegotiation at date t = 1 might lead to an equilibrium outcome where the active monitor
mixes between pH and pL, and as a result renegotiation leads to only partial liquidity provision at date
t = 1.
26package the board of directors must then determine how liquid the CEO's stake should
be in similar terms as we have outlined in this paper. Another interpretation is that the
active monitor is some large pension or mutual fund engaging in some form of shareholder
activism. As Co®ee (1991) has suggested the investment fund would then face a trade-o®
between liquidity and incentives. However, contrary to his claims our analysis suggests
that a highly liquid secondary market providing potentially large speculative gains to
speculators could actually induce more not less active monitoring.
We believe, however, that our model ¯ts best the interpretation that the active monitor
is either a bank engaged in a long term relation with the ¯rm or a venture capitalist. In
the remainder of this section we discuss in greater detail common exit clauses in venture
capital contracts and how they can be rationalized on the basis of the analysis in this
paper.
(a) Planning of exit
Venture Capital (VC) contracts reveal that venture capitalists carefully plan their
exit. Indeed, one of the most important issues for VC investors in negotiations with the
entrepreneur concerns the allocation of registration rights. If VC investors hold a minority
stake their exit will depend on decisions reached by majority shareholders. Therefore VC
investors often require a registration rights agreement giving them the right either to
have their shares included in an IPO (so called \piggyback rights") or to request that an
IPO or private placement of shares take place (so called \demand rights") (see Bartlett
1994). Venture capitalists may also hold warrants, which the company must repurchase
at an attractive price for the venture capitalist if the company does not go public within,
say, ¯ve years (see Lerner 1999, p.339). In return for granting such rights, however, the
entrepreneur often insists on a right to veto proposals to go public in the ¯rst three years
( see Levin 1995)22. Another important limitation on VC exit is that following an IPO
there is usually a six-month lock-up period contracted with underwriters, during which
the VC investor must retain a majority of their shares after the IPO.
22Alternatively, the entrepreneur may have the right to preempt by purchasing all shares of the venture
capitalist at a price speci¯ed by a formula.
27Most VC agreements usually specify that the private equity or venture capital fund
will dissolve after a period of no more than 10 to 13 years (see Gompers and Lerner 1999,
p.240). But there is evidence suggesting that VC investors generally do not seem to hold
their shares for such a long period. The average holding period is under 5 years (Sahlman
1990).
To be sure, the exact date of exit is generally not speci¯ed at the outset. Neither
does the theory predict that it should. For one thing, under the liquid contract, the
date of liquidation depends on the realization of the active monitor's liquidity needs.
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 4.1, the exact date of liquidation may depend on the
state of the placements market.
(b) Speculative monitoring and equity-based exit
General partners in venture capital funds hold fairly risky claims (usually convertibles
and warrants, and sometimes common stocks). There are two main avenues for exit. One
is a private placement or sale of the ¯rm to a (usually larger) buyer. The other is an
IPO. The consequences of these two modes of exit for the venture capitalist are largely
similar23. The \speculator" of the model is the buyer in case of a sale and the underwriter
and the stock analysts in case of an IPO.
It is widely accepted in the venture capital community that equity-based exit, whether
through an IPO or a sale, is key to the measurement of the performance of the entrepreneur-
venture capitalist team. Indeed, a precondition for a sale is often that all convertible debt
be converted prior to putting the company up for sale or an IPO (see Bartlett 1994).
To facilitate the sale of the company the general partner sometimes requests the right to
drag along the other investors when he ¯nds one (or several) buyers to purchase the com-
pany. A drag along covenant allows the general partner to force exit by the entrepreneur
and by limited partners in case he ¯nds a buyer. Similarly, a necessary condition for a
successful IPO is that enough stocks be traded in order to attract enough attention by
23This is not so for the entrepreneur, who may be able to reassume some of her control rights in case of
an IPO, but not in case of a sale. Berglof (1994) builds a theoretical model of the distributional con°icts
associated with the sale of a company.
28investors and induce speculative monitoring. Such requirements can be viewed as ways of
providing speculative monitors with enhanced incentives to acquire information, thereby
facilitating the exit of the venture capitalist.
(c) Determinants of the intensity of liquidity needs
Our theory predicts that the venture capitalist's contract should be more liquid, the
more intense and the more frequent the liquidity shock (the higher ¹1 and ¸ 24). Factors
that may impact the active monitor's liquidity needs include:
² Reputation: Well-established venture capitalists can raise large sums of money on
short notice. The certi¯cation provided by the exit mechanism is less important
for them than for less reputable venture capitalists. Our theory is therefore con-
sistent with the observation of \grandstanding" (see Gompers 1996). The evidence
shows that ¯rms backed by young venture capital ¯rms are also younger at the IPO
stage. This observation is inconsistent with the following \natural" theory linking
reputation and liquidity: a reputable venture capitalist should be more concerned
about losing his reputation, and therefore could be allowed to exit earlier. It is,
however, consistent with the explanation that more experienced venture capitalists
do not need to liquidate their stakes in order to levy money for new investments
(their \¹1" is lower).
² Credit crunch: investment opportunities are particularly attractive when other large
investors such as banks and insurance companies su®er a credit crunch or are im-
posed tighter restrictions on risky investments. One would therefore identify a credit
crunch episode as one in which ¹1 is large for venture capitalists25.
² Hot-issue markets: As discussed in Section 4.1, one would expect venture capitalists
to have a high willingness to exit in a hot-issue market.
24It is hard to distinguish empirically between ¹1 and ¸. Our two-point distribution is a special case
of a general distribution over the realization of ¹1.
25See Lerner (1999, p.337).
295 Conclusion
This paper provides a ¯rst study of the optimal design of active monitors' exit option.
An active monitor's claim is more likely to be liquid, the more intense and frequent
his liquidity needs; the more informative the speculative monitoring (in a sale, IPO or
secondary market); and the scarcer the active monitor's loanable funds at the date of
the initial outlay. In particular, we have argued that claims of active monitors should
be more liquid when more money °ows into the venture capital industry. The reason is
that the returns demanded by Venture Capital Funds are then lower and therefore the
relative cost of o®ering a more e±cient liquid contract is reduced. Now, turning to the
optimal contract for the speculative monitor, we have shown that it is (weakly) optimal
for a venture capital ¯rm to go public by issuing (options to purchase) equity rather than
safe debt in order to provide the buyers or underwriters with the appropriate incentives
to acquire information, which in turn can help improve the incentive contract with the
active monitor.
While we argued that our theory is basically consistent with existing evidence on
venture capital, further empirical validation is called for. Also, the theory should be
extended in a number of directions, both to build a richer account of venture capital
agreements (e.g relative to the choice of exit through a sale or an IPO, and to the allocation
of control rights among the general partners, the limited partners, and the entrepreneur)
and to analyze the aggregate dynamics of venture capital loanable funds and investment.
We hope research in these directions and others will develop in the near future.
30Appendix
When ¤q(¸¹1+1¡¸) > 1 the optimal contract for the active monitor which uniquely
implements the second best outcome must satisfy the new incentive constraints:
¸[qH¹1r
a + pHR
a(¹1)] ¡ ¸c ¸ ¸qL¹1r
a + (1 ¡ ¸)qLr
a, (17)
and 8
> <
> :
qH¹1ra + pHRa(¹1) ¸ c (a)
c ¸ qHra + pHRa(¹1) (b)
9
> =
> ;
(18)
These constraints are obtained by substituting for Ra(1) = c
pH into the incentive
constraints (7) and (8). Recall that unique implementation requires that constraint (16)
be binding when ¤q(¸¹1 + 1 ¡ ¸) > 1.
Hence, when constraint (16) is binding the active monitor's optimal contract solves:
min
fra;Ra(¹1)g
f¸[qH(1 ¡
¹1
¹0
)r
a + pH(1 ¡
1
¹0
)R
a(¹1)]g + ¸Ã (19)
subject to constraints (17) and (18).
Solving this problem we obtain the following proposition characterizing the optimal
contract that uniquely implements the second best outcome:
Proposition 3 Under the unique implementation requirement,
(a) If either ¹1 ￿ ¹¤ or ¹¤ < ¹1 <
qH+ ¸
1¡¸qL
qH¡qL and ¤q(¸¹1+1¡¸) > 1 then the optimal
contract is illiquid and given by
r
a = 0 and R
a(¹1) = R
a(1) =
c
pH
;
(b) If ¹1 > ¹¤ and ¤q(¸¹1 + 1 ¡ ¸) < 1 the optimal contract is liquid and given by
r
a =
c
(qH ¡ qL)(¸¹1 + 1 ¡ ¸)
, R
a(¹1) = 0 and R
a(1) =
qH
pH
r
a;
(c) If ¹1 ¸
qH+ ¸
1¡¸qL
qH¡qL and ¤q(¸¹1 + 1 ¡ ¸) > 1 the optimal contract for the active
monitor is liquid and given by:
r
a¤ =
c
¹1(qH ¡ qL) ¡ 1¡¸
¸ qL
;R
a¤(¹1) = 0andR
a¤(1) =
c
pH
31Proof: It only remains to show that the optimal contract characterized in the propo-
sition is indeed the solution to the new constrained optimization problem. As before,
constraint (17) must be binding at the optimum, so that
¸pHR
a(¹1) = ¸[c ¡ (qH ¡ qL)¹1r
a] + (1 ¡ ¸)qLr
a
Substituting for ¸pHRa(¹1) in the objective function and constraints (18) we then
obtain the same objective function as before,
min
ra fr
a[¸qH(1 ¡
¹1
¹0
) ¡ ¸(1 ¡
1
¹0
)¹1(qH ¡ qL) + (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡
1
¹0
)qL]g (20)
but a di®erent incentive constraint:
0 ¸ [qH ¡ ¹1(qH ¡ qL) +
1 ¡ ¸
¸
qL]r
a.
Note that constraint (18) (a) is always satis¯ed. The optimal contract now is liquid if
and only if
¹1 ¸
qH + ¸
1¡¸qL
qH ¡ qL
and given by
r
a =
c
¹1(qH ¡ qL) ¡ 1¡¸
¸ qL
; R
a(¹1) = 0 and R
a(1) =
c
pH
This establishes the proposition. QED
Thus, when
¤q(¸¹1 + 1 ¡ ¸) > 1
and the principal wants to guarantee unique implementation of the second best outcome,
he will have to restrict exit at date t = 1 more than before if b ¹ <
qH+ ¸
1¡¸qL
qH¡qL = (¤q(1 +
¸
1¡¸
1
1¡¤q))¡1; which is the case for example if ¹0 is su±ciently close to one.
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